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The Swedish adult education program known as the Knowledge Lift (1997–2002) was 
unprecedented in its size and scope, aiming to raise the skill level of large numbers 
of low-skill workers.  This paper evaluates the potential eﬀects of this program on 
aggregate labor market outcomes. This is done by calibrating an equilibrium search 
model with heterogeneous worker skills using pre-program data and then forecasting 
the program impacts. Our calibrations suggest that the equilibrium treatment eﬀects 
were positive – wages are predicted to increase, as are the employment rates of the 
treated. The equilibrium eﬀects magnify the partial eﬀects by a factor 1.5 to 2. This 
is due to the increase in demand for skills that is triggered by the increase in its 
supply. 
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Life-long  learning,  adult  education,  and  employability  have  become  focal  points  in  the 
labor market policies of many advanced economies (see e.g. the recent OECD Employment 
Outlook 2004). It is expected that these economies will face more turbulent conditions than 
in the past and that the development of novel production technologies will proceed at a 
sustained high speed. This will require a ﬂexible and suitably skilled workforce. Indeed, the 
role of low-educated workers has diminished in modern knowledge-based economies.  The 
fact that there is now a heavier representation of older workers in the labor force means 
that the human capital adjustment needs to be made by the existing stock of workers 
rather than solely by the inﬂow of new workers. 
Sweden is relatively well prepared for such a policy intervention, given its long tradition 
of training of adult unemployed workers (see e.g.  Ministry of Education, 1998, Friberg, 
2000, and Ministry of Industry, 2001).  In 1997, Sweden implemented a new major adult 
education program called the “Adult Education Initiative” or “Knowledge Lift” (henceforth 
denoted as KL). Without exaggeration, this constitutes the largest and most ambitious 
skill-raising program ever.  It aimed to raise the skill level of all low-skill workers to the 
medium-skill level.  It focused on workers with a low level of education.  The size of the 
program was unprecedented:  in the period 1997-2000 alone, more than 10% of the labor 
force participated in it. 
Obviously, the program reﬂected a great deal of optimism about the extent to which 
an adult’s human capital can be improved. The empirical literature on training programs 
for unemployed workers does not warrant this optimism. The general conclusion from this 
literature is that training does not have large eﬀects on individual labor market outcomes 
(see e.g.  Fay, 1996, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Martin and Grubb, 2001). 
A potential exception concerns training for women who return to the labor market after 
a spell of child-raising activity, who are potentially an important target group for adult 
education because they are sometimes not eligible for active labor market programs. How­
ever, perhaps more importantly, training participants with a low initial level of education 
beneﬁt even less than other educational groups. 
While this evidence questions the presence of eﬀects on individual outcomes, it is still 
possible with a large training program such as KL that there are macroeconomic labor 
market eﬀects. In this paper, we analyze these macroeconomic eﬀects of KL. Speciﬁcally, we 
examine the equilibrium eﬀects of KL by calibrating an equilibrium matching model with 
labor market frictions and skill heterogeneity.  Given the size of the program, equilibrium 
eﬀects may be substantial.  In addition to any eﬀect on the individuals in the program, 
other workers in the economy are likely to be impacted through changes in wages and/or 
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through changes in unemployment and employment probabilities.1  Obviously, the model 
we use should incorporate skill heterogeneity and equilibrium unemployment.  Also, ﬁrms 
should be able to choose their production technologies in the face of the prevailing skill 
distribution. We use a model based on Albrecht and Vroman (2002), which is a concise and 
amenable model satisfying the above requirements. It assumes two worker types, low skill 
and medium skill, with the number of workers of each type taken as exogenous in a given 
market.2  There are frictions in the process by which unemployed workers and vacancies 
contact one another, and the surplus generated by a worker/job match is divided using 
the Nash bargaining solution. The ﬂow output of a match depends on the skill level of the 
worker as well as on the job type as decided by the ﬁrm when it created the vacancy.3 
We use data from 1996 to calibrate the pre-KL economy.4  This allows us to set values for 
the unobserved parameters that drive the theoretical model. We then address the question: 
“Suppose KL were to change the skill distribution in the economy in a particular way. 
What would the eﬀects be?” Speciﬁcally, we impute potential post-KL skill distributions 
and solve the model for the new steady-state equilibria. We derive wages for low-skill and 
medium-skill workers as well as their unemployment rates and employment in low-skill and 
medium-skill jobs.  We also derive the overall unemployment rate, labor market tightness 
(vacancies over unemployment), the proportions of low-skill and medium-skill vacancies, 
and the equilibrium eﬀects on the treated. Since the model we use is a steady-state model, 
the aggregate eﬀects it predicts should be long-run eﬀects.  Nonetheless, we look at early 
post-KL data to see what aggregate labor market eﬀects occurred. 
We use our predicted aggregate labor market eﬀects to carry out the following policy 
experiment.  A “partial” treatment eﬀect is calculated as the diﬀerence between average 
wages and employment probabilities for a low-skill worker and a medium-skill worker cal­
ibrated to the distribution of skills in the pre-KL economy.  This approximates the eﬀect 
of upgrading the skill of a single worker, leaving the skill distribution unchanged.  Next, 
the equilibrium of the model economy in which the distribution of low- and medium-skill 
workers has been exogenously changed to the one induced by the KL is calculated.  An 
equilibrium treatment eﬀect is calculated by computing the diﬀerence in outcomes (av­
1See  e.g.  Lise,  Seitz  and  Smith  (2005)  for  a  general  discussion  of  equilibrium  evaluation  of  policy 
programs. 
2We abstract from the interaction between high-skill workers and the rest of the labor market.  We do 
this because the primary impact of the knowledge lift is on low- and medium-skill workers and because 
adding a third worker type to the model would considerably complicate our calibrations. 
3Plesca (2007) also uses the Albrecht and Vroman (2002) model as the basis for a general equilibrium 
evaluation analysis. Speciﬁcally, she evaluates the US Public Labor Exchange (PLX), a program that helps 
arrange meetings between job seekers and ﬁrms with vacancies.  She ﬁnds that the general equilibrium 
eﬀects of the PLX are substantially larger than the corresponding partial equilibrium eﬀects, including 
substantial eﬀects for workers who do not participate in the program. 
4A calibration for 1994 was also done. The results were very similar. 
2 erage wages and employment probabilities) between the two economies for workers who 
changed from low to medium skill, relative to a worker who remained low skilled in both 
economies. Spillover eﬀects are also calculated as the eﬀect on workers who remained either 
low or medium skilled in both economies. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium treatment eﬀect is 
between 1.5 and 2 times the partial treatment eﬀect and that the spillover eﬀect is nega­
tive for those who remain low skilled but positive for those who stay at the medium skill 
level. This highlights the importance of accounting for the equilibrium eﬀects of large-scale 
“treatments.” 
In addition to the aggregate labor market eﬀects that we analyze, KL may have had 
other eﬀects on the economy. For example, Bj¨ orklund et al. (2005) show that KL generated 
a large ﬂow of teachers from regular secondary education to adult education, and they argue 
that KL therefore may have generated substantial negative external eﬀects on the quality 
of regular education.  However, addressing these eﬀects is beyond the scope of our paper. 
We also do not aim to address the use of adult education by young individuals who left the 
regular school system with low educational levels, as a short-cut towards regular university 
education (see e.g.  Bj¨ orklund et al., 2005, and Ekstr¨ om, 2003, for discussions).  For this 
reason we exclude individuals aged below 25 in our calibration. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the KL program.  In Section 3, 
we describe the equilibrium model that is the basis for the calibration. Section 4 describes 
the data used to calibrate the model and gives the results of the calibration.  Section 5 
contains the results of the equilibrium analysis.  A discussion of aggregate labor market 
changes between 1996 and 2003 and how they compare to our simulation results is given 
in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes. 
2  The Knowledge Lift 
As  explained  below,  KL  was  run  through  the  existing  municipal  adult  education  sys­
tem (KOMVUX) and can be seen as a major qualitative and quantitative upscaling of 
KOMVUX. By now, many studies provide detailed descriptions of KL and/or KOMVUX 
and their participants.  See, for example, The National Agency for Education (1999), Ax­
elsson and Westerlund (1999), Skolverket (2001), and Stenberg (2003) for information on 
KL, and Skolverket (2001) and Ekstr¨ om (2003) for information on KOMVUX. We therefore 
restrict ourselves here to a brief summary. 
KL was by far the largest adult education program ever in Sweden.  It ran from July 
1, 1997 to December 31, 2002.  The objective was to increase the skill level of adult low­
skill workers to the medium skill level, thereby helping these individuals strengthen their 
position in the labor market. Here, low skill means having an educational attainment below 
the level of a 3-year “gymnasium” degree, while medium skill means having attained this 
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level but not any levels beyond that.  The 3-year gymnasium degree roughly corresponds 
to the upper secondary education level or senior high school. Since 1995 this is the lowest 
possible upper secondary school diploma, whereas before that many individuals left high 
school with a 2-year degree. The program particularly targeted unemployed adult low-skill 
workers. However, low-skill employed workers and medium-skill unemployed workers were 
also often eligible for KL, and the enrollees included many low-skill employed workers, 
working part time or full time. 
Due to KL, the number of individuals in adult education became dramatically larger 
than in earlier years (the increase in the stock of participants was about 80%).  The old 
KOMVUX system included courses that were not aimed at the attainment of a medium 
skill level but rather an improvement within the class of low skill sublevels.  Compared 
to the old KOMVUX system,  KL also involved the improvement and modernization of 
teaching methodologies and pedagogy. For all practical purposes, KL and KOMVUX were 
indistinguishable in the period in which KL ran. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, 
we simply refer to KL as the program we evaluate. 
KL focused on the enhancement of general skills (for example, English, Swedish, and 
Mathematics),  as opposed to speciﬁc skills needed for particular professions.  However, 
part of KL could be used for vocational courses and work placement.  In principle, it was 
possible to combine upper secondary courses with studies at an elementary level or with a 
program organized by the National Labor Market Board for the unemployed. The curricula 
and grade criteria for the attainment of the medium skill level were roughly the same as 
in the regular upper secondary education system. 
KL was organized at the municipal level and run through the KOMVUX system.  It 
was possible for the organization to be joint among several municipalities. A municipality 
could purchase the services of education providers and/or cooperate with them. However, 
the municipalities were responsible for admission into KL. A single course typically started 
twice a year and covered a half-year term. 
At the level of the individual, admission into KL was in principle unrestricted.  The 
underlying view was that KL participation should be led by the demand for education. A 
participant should have ample scope for personal choice regarding the type of study and 
its timing and location. Whether one could participate in a desired course only depended 
on the availability of courses and on the entry skill level requirement.  Recruitment of 
participants was sometimes carried out in cooperation with trade union organizations or 
local employment oﬃces. 
KL participants were eligible for a range of income grants and ﬁnancial study support 
measures.  Some  enrollees  received  “special  education  support”  (UBS).  The  amount  of 
ﬁnancial support was equivalent to unemployment insurance (UI). UBS was only given 
to KL participants who were entitled to UI payments at date of entry into the program. 
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Moreover, the worker had to be between 25–55 years old at date of entry into the program 
and had to study at the elementary or upper secondary level.  The grant was typically 
given for a maximum of one year.  Sometimes, special adult study assistance and funding 
were available as a combination of a grant and a loan.  Many participants relied on other 
ﬁnancial resources. An individual who was full-time in KL was considered to be out of the 
labor force unless he/she earned income on the side. 
The state channelled funds to the municipalities to ﬁnance KL. The amount of funding 
depended on the municipality’s unemployment rate and skill level distribution, and on the 
scope of the municipality’s program.  A conservative estimate is that, in the ﬁrst years of 
its existence, the state spent at least SEK 3.5 billion per year on KL. This equaled almost 
SEK 1000 per labor force participant in Sweden.  The spending covered the creation of 
some 100,000  annual study  slots.  In practice,  the funding was more  than suﬃcient to 
meet the demand for KL (see Statskontoret, 1999). This fact is important for our analysis 
because it implies that there was no quantity rationing. 
The following gives an indication of the size of the program in terms of numbers of 
enrollees.  In the fall of 1997, 538,004 individuals (out of a population of 8.8M) were (i) 
aged between 25 and 55, and (ii) participated in the municipal adult education, or were 
unemployed (in the sense of actively searching), or participated in one or more training 
programs.  About 220,000 of these participated in KL, and of these about 56,000 received 
UBS. About 35,000 KL participants were registered as unemployed, and another 5,000 par­
ticipated both in KL and in employment training. The number of registered unemployed, 
including  those  participating  in  KL  and/or  training  programs  was  about  330,000.  For 
comparison, the number of pupils in regular upper secondary school was about 300,000, 
while the number of individuals participating in employment training programs was about 
40,000.  The ﬁgures do not sum to the total of 538,004 because some individuals fall into 
more than one category.  Typically,  the number of individuals enrolled in KL is about 
50% larger than the full-time equivalent of the number of occupied slots.  This indicates 
that many enrollees were part-time participants.  Skolverket (2001) provides a wealth of 
additional information on the composition of participants and courses. 
3  The Model 
As indicated in the introduction, we use the equilibrium labor market model from Albrecht 
and Vroman (2002). We ﬁrst present a generalization of that model. Then we calibrate it 
using pre-program data. 
The model is a stylized one in which risk-neutral workers live forever. The measure of 
workers is normalized to 1. The skill distribution is taken as exogenous and we denote the 
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S
fraction of the labor force with skill level si  as pi  with 
�
pi  = 1.  Jobs are described by 
i=1 
their minimum skill requirement, y. The technology is such that the output produced by  � 
y  if  s � y
a job of type y with a worker of skill s is x(s, y) =  . 
0  if  s < y 
A job is either vacant or ﬁlled.  When a job of type y is ﬁlled by a worker of skill s, a 
wage of w(s, y) is paid and a cost of cy  is incurred.  That is, the ﬂow value to the ﬁrm of 
ﬁlling a job of type y with a worker of skill s is y − w(s, y) − cy, conditional, of course, on 
s � y. The corresponding ﬂow value to the worker holding the job is the wage.  When a 
job is vacant, the ﬁxed cost must still be paid so the ﬂow value of a vacancy of type y is 
−cy. The corresponding ﬂow value to an unemployed worker is b, which can be interpreted 
as unemployment compensation and/or the value of not working. 
Matches break up (ﬁlled jobs become vacant) at the rate δy, i.e., we assume that job 
stability varies by job type (this, as well as the dependence of c on y, generalizes Albrecht 
and Vroman, 2002). The ﬂow in the opposite direction is governed by a matching function. 
Speciﬁcally, unemployed workers and vacancies match randomly according to a constant 
returns to scale matching function 
v v 
m(u, v) = m(1,  )u = m(θ)u, where θ = 
u u 
m(θ)  5 with m�(θ) > 0 and d( )/dθ < 0. 
θ 
We use the following notation: 
U(s) is the value of unemployment for a worker of skill s 
N(s, y) is the value of employment for a worker of skill s on a job of type y 
V (y) is the value of a vacancy of type y, 
J(s, y) is the value to an employer of ﬁlling a job of type y with a worker 
of skill s. 
A match will be formed if and only if 
N(s, y) + J(s, y) � U(s) + V (y) 
5As in Albrecht and Vroman (2002),  we assume that search is undirected,  to capture the idea that 
medium-skill workers can search in the low-skill market and “crowd out” the low-skill workers.  This is 
a disadvantage (in addition to lower productivity) that low-skill workers face.  Additional arguments in 
favor of undirected search are given in Albrecht and Vroman (2002).  Gautier, Van den Berg, Van Ours 
and Ridder (2002) analyze matching in the labor market empirically.  They ﬁnd that at each level of job 
complexity there are workers with diﬀerent skill levels and that workers with a higher education are not 
more productive than lower educated workers. They use data from The Netherlands. However, our Swedish 
data also display a very high amount of wage dispersion among medium-skill workers, and the support of 
the wage distribution among them covers the support of the wage distribution of low-skill workers. 
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and when a match is formed, the wage, w(s, y), is given by the Nash bargaining condition, 
N(s, y) − U(s) = β[N(s, y) + J(s, y) − U(s) − V (y)], 
where β is the exogenously given worker’s share of the surplus. 
We assume free entry and exit of vacancies, so in equilibrium, there will be at most S 
skill requirements:  yj  = sj , j = 1, ..., S, where S is the number of worker skill levels.  We 
deﬁne φj  to be the fraction of vacancies requiring skill sj  and γi  to be the fraction of the 
unemployed who have skill si. The unemployment rate, u, labor market tightness, θ, and 
the fractions {φj }S  and {γi}S  are the fundamental endogenous variables of the model.  j=1  i=1 
The value functions for ﬁlled jobs are 
rN(si,sj ) =  w(si,sj ) + δj [U(si) − N(si,sj )] 
rJ(si,sj ) =  sj − w(si,sj ) − cj + δj [V (sj ) − J(si,sj )] 
Both of these are conditional on si ≥ sj. The value of unemployment for a worker of skill 
si  is 
rU(si) = b + m(θ)
�
φj max[N(si,sj ) − U(si), 0] 
j≤i 
and the value of a vacancy of type sj  is 
rV (sj) = −cj + 
m(θ)�
γi max[J(si,sj ) − V (sj ), 0]
θ 
j≤i 
Free entry and exit of vacancies implies V (sj ) ≤ 0, with equality if φj > 0, j = 1, ..., S. 
Substituting the above expressions into the match formation condition implies that a 
match will be formed if and only if 
sj − cj � rU(si) 
and the wage of a worker of skill si  on a job requiring skill sj  is 
w(si,sj) = β(sj − cj ) + (1 − β)rU(si). 
Both of these are conditional on si  ≥ sj . Note that this allows for wage dispersion both 
within and across worker types. 
We look for steady-state equilibria.  A steady-state equilibrium is a collection of vari­
ables u, θ, {φj }j
S 
=1, and {γi}S  such that (i) the appropriate steady-state conditions hold,  i=1 
(ii) there is free entry and exit of vacancies, i.e., V (sj ) ≤ 0 (= 0 if φj > 0), and (iii) matches 
form iﬀ sj − cj  ≥ rU(si). Several equilibrium types are possible.  For example, one might 
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consider an equilibrium in which workers at each skill level match only with vacancies re­
quiring precisely that skill, i.e., an equilibrium with perfect assortative matching. We refer 
to this case as equilibrium with ex post segmentation. At the other extreme, an equilibrium 
might entail all possible matches; i.e., a worker of skill si could match with any job of type 
sj  ≤ si. We refer to this case as equilibrium with full cross-skill matching.  Intermediate 
cases, in which some but not all possible matches are formed, are also possible. 
The nature of equilibrium depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.  If an 
equilibrium of a particular type exists, e.g., an equilibrium with ex post segmentation, then 
that equilibrium is unique within that class. There may, however, be multiple equilibria in 
the sense that equilibria of more than one type can exist simultaneously. 
In our analysis of KL, we consider only two skill levels, low and medium, and model KL 
as moving low-skill workers to the medium skill level, i.e., as a change in the proportions 
of the labor force in the various skill categories.6  We assume that before KL, the labor 
force has a particular skill distribution, and the market is in the corresponding steady­
state equilibrium.  We use pre-KL data to calibrate this equilibrium.  After KL, the labor 
force has another skill distribution, with more medium-skill workers and fewer low-skill 
workers. In the next section, we simulate the new labor market equilibrium on the basis of 
possible new skill distributions using the structural parameters obtained in the calibration. 
Comparison of the equilibrium outcomes is informative about the equilibrium eﬀects of KL 
for various worker types.  We are particularly interested in the changes in outcomes for 
individuals who were previously low skill and currently medium skill. 
A comparative statics exercise that compares two equilibria cannot be translated into a 
sequence of actions and reactions by individual agents. However, from the above model we 
can get some idea about the underlying mechanisms.7  With more medium-skill workers, the 
rate at which employers meet them increases. Similarly, the rate at which low-skill workers 
are contacted decreases.  This provides an incentive for employers to create medium-skill 
jobs rather than low-skill jobs. Labor demand thus adjusts to labor supply. The extent to 
which this occurs depends on the parameters of the model and on the assumed production 
technology.8  Simultaneously, labor market tightness, the transition rates from unemploy­
6As discussed in footnote 2, we ignore any interaction between high-skill workers and the rest of the 
labor market. 
7We do not solve for the transition path between equilibria. The KL changed the low- and medium-skill 
labor forces gradually over time, and tracing out the corresponding dynamics for low- and medium-skill 
vacancies  and  unemployment  would  require  us  to  make  arbitrary  assumptions  about  the  time  path  of 
changes in the labor force stocks. 
8For example, if β  is close to one, so almost all of the rent from the match goes to the worker, the 
vacancy mix is relatively insensitive to changes in labor force composition, and the opposite is true if β 
is close to zero.  In terms of the production technology, one could assume, as has been done in variations 
on Albrecht and Vroman (2002), that medium-skill workers are more productive than low-skill workers at 
low-skill jobs but less productive than they would be in medium-skill jobs. See, e.g., Davidson, Matusz, and 
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ment to employment by worker-skill level, the unemployment rate, and the wage rates by 
worker/job-skill combination change.  Again the results depend on the model parameters 
and functions. 
It is important to point out that we do not assume that KL has a direct eﬀect on 
the individual contact rate for a given skill level in a given equilibrium.  So in this sense 
there is no causal “job search assistance” eﬀect on the transition rates to work.  However, 
individuals who are treated in KL qualify for a diﬀerent set of jobs in the new equilibrium. 
In addition, since KL aﬀects the proportions of low-skill workers and low-skill jobs, there 
is an indirect eﬀect on the transition rates to work even for individuals who do not change 
skill level. 
4  Calibration to Pre-Program Data 
4.1  Data for the calibration 
The data we use for our baseline calibration are for 1996,9  the year before the start of 
KL.  In  particular,  we  use  data  from  the  Swedish  labor  force  survey  (AKU)  to  derive 
unemployment, employment, and labor market ﬂows. We use wage data from LINDA, the 
longitudinal individual data set with a 3 per cent sample of the Swedish population. (See 
Edin and Fredriksson 2000.) 
For our calibration, we use two skill levels, namely, low-skill (s1) and medium-skill (s2). 
We assume exogenous skill fractions,  identifying skill with educational attainment.  We 
take those with less education than a 3-year gymnasium degree, i.e., SUN Codes 1, 2 and 
3, to be low-skill and those with a 3-year gymnasium degree (SUN Code 4) and those with 
less than 3 years of post-gymnasium education (SUN Code 5) to be medium-skill.  AKU 
Tables 43 and 48 provides observations for labor force participants and unemployed aged 
25-64 by SUN Codes.10 
Shevchenko (2007).  Changes like these would aﬀect the quantitative, but not the qualitative, properties 
of  the  model,  at  least  so  long  as  the  equilibrium  does  not  switch  from  cross-skill  matching  to ex  post 
segmentation. 
9We also calibrate the model for 1994. The results for both 1994 and 1996 are given in Appendix Table 
1. 
10SUN stands for Swedish Education Level.  There are 7 SUN codes.  Category 6 is 3 or more years of 
post-gymnasium education and category 7 is doctoral education. We assume there is no interaction between 
the labor markets for workers in these higher skill levels and those that we are calling medium skill.  We 
attempted to calibrate a three-skill level model extension, but the data appeared to be inconsistent with 
such a model. 
9 Unemployment

SUN Codes  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
LF in 100’s  4320  4544  12346  5870  5649  32729 
U in 100’s  398  431  996  448  249  2522 
U rates  .092  .095  .081  .076  .044  .077 
These imply that p1  = 0.648 and p2  = 0.352. In addition, the fraction of unemployment 
accounted for by low-skill workers γ1 equals 398+431+996  = 0.724 (implying that γ2 = 0.276), 2522 
and the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates are u1 = 0.086 and u2 = 0.060. 
We also quantify the exit rates out of unemployment for the two skill groups. For this 
we use AKU Table 49, giving the elapsed unemployment duration distribution by skill. 
Our model assumes exponential duration distributions.  The exponentiality assumption 
helps us in two ways. We have data on elapsed, as opposed to completed, durations.  The 
exponential assumption implies that these two distributions, i.e., of elapsed and completed 
durations, are the same. Second, if ξ is the median of an exp{λ} distribution, then λ = ln 2 , ξ 
i.e., we can use the median of the elapsed duration distribution to estimate the exponential 
parameter. As a result, the exit rates out of unemployment for low and medium skills equal 
1.867 and 2.163, respectively, in per-year terms. 
Using the wage data from LINDA, we set w11 = 180, 000, the median of real wages for 
low-skill workers, w21 = 192, 276, the 40th percentile real wages for workers with more than 
3 years of gymnasium, and w22 = 224, 274, the average of the 60th and 70th percentile real 
wages for these workers.11  We use wij  as a shorthand for w(si,sj ). 
4.2  The calibration of the pre-KL equilibrium 
Since we are considering a model with 2 skill levels, there are 2 possible equilibrium con­
ﬁgurations, namely 
1.  Cross-skill  matching:	 In  this  equilibrium,  medium-skill  workers  match  with  both 
medium-skill and low-skill vacancies.  Low-skill workers match only with low-skill 
vacancies. 
2.  Ex-post segmentation:	 In this equilibrium, medium-skill workers match only with 
medium-skill vacancies, and low-skill workers match only with low-skill vacancies. 
The large amount of variation in the wage data for medium-skill workers ﬁts better 
with the ﬁrst conﬁguration. Indeed, in Appendix 2 we demonstrate that calibration of the 
second conﬁguration for 1996 provides nonsensical results. We therefore base our analysis 
on the cross-skill matching equilibrium. 
11These are annual earnings expressed in 1996 SEK. 
10 The ﬁrst step in the calibration is to use the exit rates from unemployment and the 
steady-state conditions to identify the ﬂow parameters, namely, δ1,δ2,φ1,φ2, and the con­
tact rate, m(θ).  12 The ﬁrst steady-state condition is that the ﬂow of low-skill workers into 
low-skill employment equals the ﬂow of low-skill workers back into unemployment.  This 
can be expressed as 
φ1m(θ)γ1u = δ1e11, 
where e11 is the fraction of the labor force accounted for by employment of low-skill workers 
in low-skill jobs. Given our estimated exit rates and data on unemployment by skill level, we 
know the value of the left-hand side of this equation. Further, since e11 = p1 − γ1u, we can 
compute the remaining unknown in this ﬁrst steady-state equation, namely, δ1. The second 
steady-state condition is that the ﬂow of medium-skill workers into low-skill employment 
equals the corresponding ﬂow from low-skill employment back into unemployment, 
φ1m(θ)γ2u = δ1e21. 
This condition gives us e21, the fraction of the labor force accounted for by medium-skill 
workers employed in low-skill jobs.  Next, the ﬂow of medium-skill workers into medium­
skill employment equals the corresponding ﬂow from medium-skill employment back into 
unemployment. That is, 
φ2m(θ)γ2u = δ2e22. 
We know e21 + e22, i.e., total employment of medium-skill workers. We know e21 from the 
second steady-state condition, so we know e22. The third steady-state condition thus gives 
us δ2. 
Finally, we know that φ1 + φ2  = 1. Since we know the exit rates from unemployment 
for each skill group, we can recover m(θ), φ1, and φ2. It may be possible at this point to 
use the requirement that each φi ∈ [0, 1] to rule out some equilibrium possibilities. 
In the second step, we set values for b and r. For our speciﬁc application, we assume 
that r = 0.05 and that b = 83, 226, which equals 0.5 times the 30th percentile real wage for 
the workers with less than a 3-year gymnasium degree.13  Given the three wage equations 
w(si,sj) = β(sj − cj ) + (1 − β)rU(si) for si ≥ sj 
12We do not have reliable data on employment duration by worker skill level.  If we did, we could, of 
course, simply estimate δ1  and δ2  directly. 
13This value is a compromise between the level of unemployment beneﬁts for low- and medium-skilled 
workers,  the  zero  level  of  personal  income  for  potential  program  participants  who  are  not  entitled  to 
UI  or  welfare  (e.g.  because  they  are  labor  market  non-participants  with  a  working  partner),  and  the 
non-pecuniary disutility of being unemployed. 
11 and the expression for rU(s1), we can solve for s1 − c1, s2 − c2, rU(s1), rU(s2), and β. 
At  this  point,  we  need  to  check  that  the  relevant  conditions  on  these  values  for  a 
cross-skill matching equilibrium type hold, namely, 
s1 − c1  ≥  rU(s2) 
s1 − c1  ≥  rU(s1) 
s2 − c2  ≥  rU(s2). 
If these are not satisﬁed then the parameters of the model are inconsistent with this type 
of equilibrium. 
The third step of our calibration strategy is to use the zero-value conditions to recover 
the cost parameters and the parameters of the matching function. At this point, we need to 
ﬁx two more parameters. We assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function, so m(θ) = Aθα , 
and we choose plausible values for A and α. We choose α = 0.5, with reference to estimates 
from the empirical literature on matching functions (e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). 
The choice of A is more arbitrary, but since we have already recovered m(θ) from the ﬁrst 
step of our procedure, a choice of A is equivalent to choosing θ. Since the numerator of θ 
(i.e., the measure of vacancies) is diﬃcult to quantify, this can be viewed as a normalization. 
We take A = 5. Finally, the zero-value conditions for the relevant equilibrium type give us 
c1  and c2. We would naturally like c1 < c2  and s1 < s2. 
We now give the results, which are also given in Appendix Table 1. The exit rates from 
unemployment are m(θ)φ1 = 1.867 for low-skill workers and m(θ)(φ1 + φ2) = m(θ) = 2.163 
for medium-skill workers.  These imply that φ1  = 0.863 and φ2  = 0.137. Putting these 
values into the steady-state conditions allows us to recover the job-speciﬁc exit rates, δ1 = 
0.176 and δ2  = 0.059, and the skill composition of employment, e11  = 0.592, e21  = 0.225, 
and e22  = 0.106. Subsequently, from step 2, we have net outputs of s1 − c1  = 194, 920 
and s2 − c2  =  272, 590. The two ﬂow unemployment values are rU(s1)  =  169, 560 and 
rU(s2) = 190, 430, while labor’s share of the match values is β  = 0.412. Note that the 
inequality required for cross-skill matching (s1 − c1 > rU(s2)) is satisﬁed. 
Finally, we solve for	θ, c1, c2, s1, and s2. Given m(θ) = 2.163, our choice of α and 
m(θ)
A implies θ  = 0.187 and  = 11.56. We recover the costs and gross outputs from 
θ 
the zero-value conditions.  These are c1  = 589, 760, c2  = 1, 414, 000, s1  = 784, 680, and 
s2  = 1, 686, 590. This solution ranks the cost and productivity parameters in the desired 
order. 
Before turning to the simulations of KL, note that our calibration results can be used to 
assess the eﬀects of upgrading the skill level of a single low-skill individual to the medium 
skill level.  In a market with a continuum of workers the upgrading has no measurable 
eﬀects on the other agents, and we restrict attention to the eﬀects on outcomes for the 
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individual under consideration.  We may call these the “partial” eﬀects of a skill-raising 
program. They do not have an empirical counterpart, but as we shall see they are helpful 
to understand the equilibrium eﬀects. 
For such an individual, the average wage changes from w11  to the mean wage among 
medium-skill workers (
�
j e2j w2j / 
�
j e2j ), which is a real wage increase of 22, 530.  The 
average unemployment rate  changes  from  u1  to  u2,  i.e.  it decreases  by 2.6 percentage 
points.  This  diﬀerence  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  medium-skill  jobs  have  a  much 
lower job separation rate than low-skill jobs, and partly due to the higher exit rate out of 
unemployment for medium-skill workers. Subsequently, it can be deduced that the average 
annual income (which is a weighted average of b and the average wage) increases by 23, 688. 
This exceeds the eﬀect on the average wage, despite the fact that income in unemployment 
is independent of skill level.  This is of course due to the dominating reduction of the 
average amount of time spent unemployed. 
5  Simulation of KL 
In our simulations, we suppose that KL reduces the proportion of low-skill workers from 
p1 = .648 to .60 and then to .55. We feel that this captures the magnitude of the change 
in  skill  levels  that  KL  could  potentially  have  produced.  We  keep  the  other  structural 
parameters ﬁxed at the values obtained in the last section,  i.e.,  r  = 0.05, b  =  83, 226, 
m(θ) = 5θ.5 , δ1  = 0.176, δ2  = 0.059, c1  =  589, 760, c2  = 1, 424, 000, s1  =  784, 680, 
s2  = 1, 686, 590.  In  Appendix  3  we  derive  the  equations  that  must  be  solved  for  the 
simulation. The results of our simulations are given below. We ﬁrst discuss the equilibrium 
eﬀects on aggregate outcomes and then the equilibrium eﬀects at the individual level. 
The results suggest that a program such as KL that moves workers from low to medium 
skill can have important equilibrium eﬀects.  The ﬁrst-order equilibrium eﬀect comes via 
the equilibrium change in job composition.  As the fraction of medium-skill workers in 
the labor force increases, the fraction of vacancies tailored towards those workers increases 
commensurately.  In our simulations, increases in p2  translate to a little more than one­
for-one increases in φ2. The measure of low-skill workers employed in low-skill jobs (e11) 
falls by about the same amount as p2  rises.  There is a slight decrease in the measure of 
medium-skill workers employed in low-skill jobs (e21).  On the one hand, there are more 
medium-skill workers; on the other hand, there are fewer low-skill jobs. In our simulations, 
the second eﬀect dominates slightly.  Finally, the increase in the measure of medium-skill 
workers employed in medium-skill jobs increases by a bit more than the fraction p2  does. 
The eﬀect of a change in skill composition on aggregate unemployment is small.  This 
is  partly  because  the  change  in  labor  market  tightness  is  small.  The  fact  that  θ  falls 
means that workers in general take a bit longer to locate a vacancy.  However, there are 
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Table 1: Simulation Results 
Baseline  Simulation1  Simulation2 
p1  0.648  0.600  0.550 
p2  0.352  0.400  0.450 
θ  0.187  0.176  0.167 
m(θ)  2.163  2.100  2.045 
u  0.077  0.079  0.081 
u1  0.086  0.094  0.103 
u2  0.060  0.057  0.054 
γ1  0.724  0.712  0.698 
γ2  0.276  0.288  0.302 
φ1  0.863  0.807  0.750 
φ2  0.137  0.193  0.250 
e11  0.592  0.544  0.493 
e21  0.225  0.220  0.213 
e22  0.106  0.157  0.212 
w11  180,000  178,860  177,620 
w21  192,276  195,680  198,860 
w22  224,274  227,680  230,860 
rU1  169,560  167,610  165,500 
rU2  190,430  196,220  201,620 
14 important distributional eﬀects on unemployment across the two skill categories.  There 
are more medium-skill workers, and these workers on average ﬁnd jobs more quickly and 
on average retain them longer than low-skill workers do.  Unemployment even decreases 
among the fraction of medium-skill workers who have always been medium-skill, because, 
even though m(θ) falls slightly, there are relatively more medium-skill jobs which are on 
average kept longer. At the same time, the remaining low-skill workers have more diﬃculty 
ﬁnding a job than they did before the policy change.  The reason is again the shift in job 
composition – relatively fewer low-skill vacancies are being opened (φ1 falls). The fraction 
of unemployment accounted for by medium-skill workers, γ2, increases simply because there 
are now more medium-skill workers. 
There is also a clear eﬀect on the distribution of real wages. The real wages of low-skill 
workers fall whereas those of medium-skill workers increase on both low- and medium-skill 
jobs. This reﬂects the change in unemployment values for the two worker types. The value 
of  unemployment  among  low-skill  workers  falls  because  these  workers  now  take  longer 
on average to ﬁnd a job;  i.e.,  φ1m(θ) decreases.14  The value of unemployment among 
medium-skill workers falls with the decrease in m(θ), but this eﬀect is more than oﬀset by 
the increase in φ2, i.e., the improvement in the mix of job opportunities. 
One could, in principle, use our simulation results to calculate the overall costs and 
beneﬁts of the KL. Net output per worker per year can be calculated as 
(e11 + e21)(s1 − c1) + e22(s2 − c2) − φ1θuc1 − φ2θuc2. 
The  ﬁrst  term  in  the  above  expression  is  output  per  ﬁlled  low-skill  job,  the  second  is 
output per ﬁlled medium-skill job, the third gives vacancy creation costs for low-skill jobs, 
and the fourth gives vacancy creation costs for medium-skill jobs.  Plugging in baseline 
values gives a ﬁgure of 176,947 SEK per worker; using the corresponding values from the 
ﬁrst simulation gives a ﬁgure of 179,707 SEK per worker.  That is, our more conservative 
simulation suggests an increase in annual net output of 2,760 SEK per worker. The increase 
in net output comes from the changed composition of employment – the fraction of the 
labor force that is employed in low-skill work falls and the fraction employed in medium­
skill work rises.  This is oﬀset to some extent by an increase in vacancy creation costs 
(mostly because φ2  rises). Multiplying 2,760 SEK per worker by the total size of the low­
and medium-skill labor force (3,173,200 in 2003) gives an overall gain of 8.76 billion SEK 
per year.  This is, of course, a phenomenally large number.  On the other hand, the costs 
of the KL were also phenomenally high. The expected cost ﬁgures in Statskontoret (1999) 
mentioned in Section 2 produce a total cost estimate of 21 billion SEK, while estimates 
in Stenberg and Westerlund (2006) lead to total cost estimate of 27 billion SEK. But if 
one could quantify and include the indirect costs discussed by Bj¨ orklund, et al.  (2005) 
14The wages in Table 1 are expressed in 1996 SEK. 
15 Table 2: Equilibrium average treatment eﬀects if KL changes the relative 
measure of low skilled from 0.65 to 0.55 and that of medium skilled 
from 0.35 to 0.45 
outcome measure:  average  employment  average 
wage  probability  income 
(a) pre-KL, low skill  180  0.914  172 
(b) pre-KL, medium skill  203  0.940  195 
(c) post-KL, low skill  178  0.897  168 
(d) post-KL, medium skill  215  0.946  208 
“partial” treatment eﬀect on treated: b minus a  23  0.026  23 
equil. change for remaining low skilled: c − a  –2  -0.017  -4 
equil. change for remaining medium skilled: d − b  12  0.006  13 
equil. change for treated: d − a  35  0.032  37 
equil. treatment eﬀect: (d − a) − (c − a)  37  0.049  40 
Note: Monetary variables are annual averages in 1000’s of 1996 SEK 
then total costs would be substantially higher.  In short, while the above calculation is 
suggestive, we prefer to remain agnostic regarding an overall cost-beneﬁt calculation. 
We next consider equilibrium eﬀects at the individual level.  The top panel of Table 2 
summarizes the average wage, employment, and income outcomes, before and after KL, 
and by skill level.  These are subsequently used to quantify the changes in outcomes for 
those who stay low skill, those who stay medium skill, and those whose skills are upgraded, 
in the bottom panel of the table. For completeness we also list “partial” eﬀects, which are 
analogous to results of microeconometric analyses of the eﬀect of treatment on the treated. 
The last row of Table 2 gives the eﬀects on the outcomes for the low-skill individuals whose 
skills are actually upgraded, by comparing them to the change in post-program outcomes of 
the individuals whose skills are not upgraded. These are the counterparts of the diﬀerence­
in-diﬀerences and the conditional probit analysis found in the microeconometric evaluation 
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literature.15  They may be called the average equilibrium treatment eﬀects on the treated. 
The  rows  in  the  top  panel  of  the  table  display  the  same  ranking  for  each  outcome 
measure:  c < a < b < d.  This conﬁrms for each outcome measure that the treated gain 
most from the program.  Those who have always been medium skill also beneﬁt, whereas 
the remaining low skill suﬀer. Moreover, the equilibrium eﬀects are always a factor 1.5 to 
2 times larger than the “partial” eﬀects.  Again, this is because the program generates an 
equilibrium response of the skill distribution of vacancies towards the higher skill.  In this 
sense, the program has a multiplier eﬀect at the aggregate level. 
To  what  extent  do  the  above  treatment  eﬀects  agree  with  earlier  microeconometric 
studies?  To date, a few studies have examined the eﬀects of adult education in Sweden 
on individual labor market outcomes.  Several studies compare individual labor market 
outcomes between unemployed individuals who enroll in KL and unemployed individu­
als who enroll in labor market training, using propensity score matching or IV methods 
(see, e.g., Axelsson and Westerlund 1999 and Stenberg 2003). The results depend strongly 
on the outcome measure, the evaluation method, and the type of labor market training 
and subpopulation considered.16  Albrecht, Van den Berg, and Vroman (2005) performs 
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and conditional probit analyses.  The simulated eﬀect on employ­
ment in the current paper is in agreement with their econometric results for young men. 
Our current ﬁnding that the average “partial” eﬀect on wages is positive and bounded 
from above by the average equilibrium eﬀect on wages is harder to reconcile with the cor­
responding econometric results that suggest that there is no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect 
on the treated.  However, the “post-program” year used in our earlier microeconometric 
analysis was 2000 and fell in the middle of the era during which KL ran.  In 2000, not 
enough time had passed to allow the full eﬀects of the program to come to fruition.  In­
deed, in 2000, individuals whose skills were upgraded may not even have had enough time 
to leave their post-program dip.17  Employment eﬀects may reveal themselves earlier than 
wage eﬀects if the wage setting institutions do not allow for swift wage adjustments.18  In a 
15An example of this type of analysis can be found in Albrecht, Van den Berg, and Vroman (2005). 
16For the US, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (2003) estimate the eﬀects of adult education using a 
sample of displaced prime-aged workers. They ﬁnd sizeable returns. However, as Bj¨ orklund, et al. (2005) 
argue, generalizing from evidence on US adult education programs is diﬃcult because there are so many 
low-skilled  individuals  in  the  US,  many  of  whom  may  have  had  insuﬃcient  human  capital  investment 
opportunities earlier in life.  Indeed the skill distribution in Sweden is more compressed than in the US 
(see Bj¨ orklund, et al. 2005 for an exposition). 
17Also, the sample sizes in the econometric analysis in Albrecht, Van den Berg and Vroman (2005) may 
have been too small to detect signiﬁcant eﬀects. 
18Of course, the simulated equilibrium wage eﬀects may be aﬀected by misspeciﬁcation of the equilibrium 
model.  An equilibrium model with skill heterogeneity along the lines of Heckman, Lochner and Taber 
(1998), for instance, would give diﬀerent results. In their model, there are no matching frictions and thus 
no unemployment. Wages are determined by equating supply and demand, so a rise in tuition subsidies for 
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more recent study, Stenberg and Westerlund (2006) use data for the period 1993 through 
2003 and ﬁnd that the annual earnings eﬀect for participants is signiﬁcantly positive if the 
length of stay in KL exceeds one semester. 
6	 The Aggregate Changes in the Swedish Labor Mar­
ket from the pre-KL to post-KL (1996 to 2003) 
To provide further insight into the aggregate eﬀects of the KL program, we look at changes 
in the Swedish labor market from 1996 to 2003 in this section.  In addition, we compare 
the results of our simulations with the changes that actually  occurred in Sweden.  We 
begin with two ﬁgures that summarize aggregate labor market developments for low- and 
medium-skill workers over this period.  Figure 1 shows the time paths of w11, w21, and 
w22  (all expressed in 1996 SEK) over 1993-2003; Figure 2 shows the corresponding time 
series for u1  and u2. These ﬁgures indicate that any short-run cycles are dominated by 
the dichotomy between the adverse conditions in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and the good 
conditions after that.  The early to mid-1990s was a particularly diﬃcult period for the 
Swedish economy. In particular, unemployment rates were extraordinarily high relative to 
the rates experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. The situation began to improve in the mid­
1990s.  Wages began to grow again starting in 1995, and unemployment rates fell sharply 
starting in 1997.  In short, in 1996,  just before the KL began, labor market conditions 
had been quite bad for several years.  By 2002, when the KL concluded, conditions had 
improved dramatically.  However, unemployment rates responded slowly over this period 
to the improving conditions in the labor market because by the end of the recession in the 
early 1990s a large stock of long-term unemployed individuals had accumulated. 
college students increases the supply of college graduates, which in turn reduces their wages.  In a model 
like ours, an increase in the medium-skill labor force leads employers to open more medium-skill vacancies; 
i.e., supply can in eﬀect create its own demand. 
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Table 3: Simulated vs Actual Labor Market Data 
1996  Simulation1  Simulation2  2003 
p1  0.648  0.600  0.550  0.584 
p2  0.352  0.400  0.450  0.416 
u  0.077  0.079  0.081  0.045 
u1  0.086  0.094  0.103  0.046 
u2  0.060  0.057  0.054  0.043 
1 
φm(θ)  0.536  0.590  0.652  0.363 
1 
m(θ)  0.463  0.476  0.489  0.336 
γ1  0.724  0.712  0.698  0.601 
γ2  0.276  0.288  0.302  0.399 
w11  180,000  178,860  177,620  211,970 
w21  192,276  195,680  198,860  219,939 
w22  224,274  227,680  230,860  261,011 
The next step is to compare developments in observables with the predictions generated 
by our simulations. This is done in Table 3, which presents a comparison of the labor market 
data for 1996 and 2003 from the Swedish Labor Force Survey as well as the relevant wage 
ﬁgures from the LINDA Survey.  In addition, we insert the model simulations reported in 
the previous section.  These data indicate that the proportion of workers in the low-skill 
group fell from 0.648 in 1996 to 0.584 in 2003, which is between our simulated changes 
to 0.60 and 0.55. While the model predicted that labor market tightness would decline, 
we see that the opposite occurred in the Swedish economy.  The unemployment rate fell 
dramatically  from  0.077  to  0.045,  reﬂecting  large  decreases  in  expected  unemployment 
duration for both low- and medium-skill workers. (Expected unemployment durations are 
1/φm(θ) and 1/m(θ) for the two skill groups, respectively.). Of course, any comparison of 
simulation outcomes and post-program outcomes is hampered by external long-run trends 
and short-run cycles in the outcomes, as those are not incorporated into the equilibrium 
model. It therefore makes sense to focus on the relative ordering of eﬀects across groups of 
workers. For a program that resulted in p1 = 0.6, the simulations predicted that γ1 = 0.712, 
γ2  = 0.288, u1  = 0.094 and u2  = 0.057. In the 2003 data, we see that γ1  fell and γ2  rose 
as predicted, but the eﬀects were much larger than in the simulations.  We also see that 
because overall unemployment fell, the unemployment rates among both the low skilled and 
medium skilled fell.  In contrast to the model predictions, the fall was greater among the 
low skilled than among the medium skilled.  In any case, from the overall unemployment 
rate, it is clear that 2003 had a much more favorable labor market than 1996, and this 
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complicates our assessments.  With respect to wages, the simulations predicted that real 
wages for low-skill workers would fall.  They rose, but this is likely due to an increasing 
trend in overall productivity. 
Since ours is a steady-state model, one could argue that evaluating its forecasts over 
a 7-year period is not a fair test.  After all, the economy was subjected to a major skill­
enhancing program and may take longer to adjust.  Insofar as the economy was able to 
adjust, our model predicts that the upgrading of the skills of a large fraction of the low-skill 
work force eventually (in steady-state equilibrium) would lead to an economy with more 
medium-skill jobs and fewer low-skill jobs.  It further predicts wage increases for those 
who make the skill upgrade. We note in the table that the proportion of low-skill workers 
declined, but more detailed data indicates that this decline occurred in the lower education 
categories (SUN codes 1 and 2), while the highest education category in the low-skill group 
(SUN code 3) had an increase in labor force.  This means that the low-skill workers may 
have had skills upgraded, but failed to leave the low-skill group making it more productive 
on average. 
One obvious factor that is particularly important in explaining the discrepancies be­
tween our simulations and the actual changes in the Swedish labor market is the produc­
tivity growth in the Swedish economy over the period 1996 to 2003.  Between 1996 and 
2003, productivity for the economy as a whole grew by 19.3 percent.19  The simulations 
given in Section 4 assumed that the productivity of workers remained at the 1996 level. 
In an eﬀort to better explain the 2003 data, we reran the simulations incorporating the 
productivity change. To do this, we scaled up s1, s2, c1, and c2, all by 19.3 per cent.20  The 
new simulation results are shown in Table 4. 
19This ﬁgure is based on the data underlying the analysis presented in Fredriksson and Topel (2006). 
We thank Peter Fredriksson for sharing these data with us. 
20If technical change was biased towards more highly skilled workers over this period, that would argue 
for more growth in s2 than in s1.However, as we argued above, we believe the composition of the low-skill 
group changed for the better. This is an argument for more growth in s1  than in s2. 
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Table 4: Simulated vs Actual Labor Market Data 
(Productivity Increase of 19.3%) 
Simulation1  Simulation2  2003 
p1  0.600  0.550  0.584 
p2  0.400  0.450  0.416 
θ  0.204  0.193  0.353 
u1  0.086  0.094  0.046 
u2  0.055  0.052  0.043 
1 
φm(θ)  0.535  0.592  0.363 
1 
m(θ)  0.442  0.456  0.336 
γ1  0.702  0.688  0.601 
γ2  0.298  0.312  0.399 
w11  212,700  211,110  211,970 
w21  231,400  235,330  219,939 
w22  269,590  273,520  261,011 
These simulations do much better in matching the wage data, particularly for the low­
skill workers.  They overestimate wages for the other group, but the average of the two 
simulations is only 6 percent over for the medium-skill workers at low-skill jobs and only 
4 percent over for medium-skill workers at medium-skill jobs.  These simulations also do 
a bit better in the unemployment ﬁgures.  They are still however far oﬀ for the realized 
unemployment rates. In retrospect, perhaps this is not so surprising. First, as the extensive 
literature based on Shimer (2005) suggests, models with matching frictions in which wages 
are determined by Nash bargaining typically do not do a good job of capturing the eﬀects 
of productivity changes on vacancies and unemployment. Second, the dramatic recession in 
Sweden in the early 1990s led to major policy interventions that directly inﬂuenced the skill­
speciﬁc unemployment rates.  Before the early 1990s, the main active labor market policy 
program  in  Sweden  was  Labor  Market  Training  (LMT).  This  is  an  expensive  program 
of vocational training for unemployed workers with relatively good prospects.  Usually, 
participation in an active labor market program was suﬃcient to ensure an extension of 
the unemployment beneﬁts entitlement period. When unemployment rates for low-skilled 
workers sky-rocketed during the recession,  the use of LMT exploded beyond what was 
thought to be eﬀective, and as a result, a range of new programs was introduced in order 
to accommodate low-skilled workers and their need to be able to extend their beneﬁts 
entitlement by way of program participation (see Richardson and Van den Berg,  2006, 
for details).  When at least some of these programs work, and some of these participants 
are not counted as unemployed, then the unemployment rate among low-skilled workers 
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decreases  for  reasons  outside  of  our  model.  Finally,  as  we  noted  above,  in  the  actual 
Swedish economy, the proportion of low-skill workers declined to a ﬁgure between the two 
simulations.21  This decline was in part due to retirements of older, less-educated workers 
and entry of younger and better-educated workers rather than to the KL program.  Both 
within and between skill groups, the composition of cohorts exiting into retirement is most 
likely diﬀerent from the composition of new entrants. To some extent, this is captured by 
our correction for productivity changes during the observation window.  However, a more 
detailed analysis is infeasible because the precise compositional changes may have been 
triggered by the policy that we are evaluating in the ﬁrst place. After the introduction of 
KL, the low-skill labor force may have been “less low skilled” than before, and, perhaps, 
the medium-skill labor force was “more low skilled” than it was before.  Other trends in 
education may be relevant as well; for example, the best in the medium-skill category may 
nowadays end up being high skilled.  In sum, compositional changes may go some ways 
towards explaining our inability to match the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates. 
7  Conclusions 
Our theoretical analysis of an equilibrium search model with heterogeneity, together with 
the calibration of the model and the simulation of the policy change,  provide some in­
teresting  insights into the  equilibrium  eﬀects  of  the  knowledge lift  program.  Most  no­
tably, according to the model, the program should generate an equilibrium change in the 
skill distribution of vacancies towards higher skills.  In our simulations, as the fraction of 
medium-skill workers in the labor force increases at the expense of the fraction of low­
skill workers, the fraction of vacancies tailored towards the medium-skill workers increases 
commensurately, almost one-for-one.  This change in vacancy composition leads to corre­
sponding changes in the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates and in the wages paid to low­
and medium-skill workers, for the latter on both low- and medium-skill jobs. 
Our simulations suggest substantial equilibrium eﬀects. Will the knowledge lift program 
have such large eﬀects in the long run?  This is of course diﬃcult to assess.  In the short 
run, i.e., by 2003, we see substantial changes in unemployment for the low- versus middle­
skill workers in Sweden.  Should these be attributed to KL? Probably not.  Rather than 
make large claims for our model, we would rather argue that such macroeconomic analysis 
focuses attention on eﬀects beyond the impacts on those directly enrolled in the training 
program. 
Indeed, we view this point as a major contribution of our paper.  Our approach estab­
lishes a link between, on the one hand, the microeconometric literature on the evaluation 
21In fact, the total size of the labor force in the low- and medium-skill categories declined between 1996 
and 2003 from 3,272,900.to 3,173,200 (by more than 3 percent). 
22 of treatments for unemployed workers, and, on the other, the macroeconomic literature on 
the implications of productivity change and changes in the skill distribution.  Our anal­
ysis incorporates equilibrium eﬀects of large-scale programs on typical microeconometric 
outcomes such as wages, employment status and income.  We show how the eﬀect on an 
individual’s outcome relates to a partial treatment eﬀect and to equilibrium eﬀects on the 
untreated and on the treated.  For each outcome measure,  the treated gain most from 
the program.  Those who have always been medium skill also beneﬁt, whereas those who 
remain low skill suﬀer.  Our simulations suggest that the equilibrium eﬀects are always a 
factor 1.5 to 2 times larger than the “partial” eﬀects. For large programs such as KL, this 
perspective is an important one to keep in mind, and we believe that models such as ours 
are useful in pointing this out. 
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Appendix 1. Calibration Results 
Table A1:  Calibration Results 
1996  1994 
p1  0.648  0.653 
p2  0.352  0.347 
θ  0.187  0.203 
m(θ)  2.163  2.252 
u  0.077  0.074 
u1  0.086  0.083 
u2  0.060  0.056 
γ1  0.724  0.738 
γ2  0.276  0.262 
φ1  0.863  0.822 
φ2  0.137  0.178 
δ1  0.176  0.169 
δ2  0.059  0.067 
e11  0.592  0.598 
e21  0.225  0.212 
e22  0.106  0.116 
real w11  180,000  169,739 
real w21  192,276  184,437 
real w22  224,274  214,655 
β  0.412  0.391 
s1 − c1  194,920  184,730 
s2 − c2  272,590  262,010 
rU(s1)  169,560  160,110 
rU(s2)  190,430  184,250 
c1  589,760  564,690 
c2  1,414,000  1,177,2000 
s1  784,680  749,420 
s2  1,686,590  1,439,210 
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Appendix 2. Calibration of the ex post segmentation equilibrium 
In an ex post segmentation equilibrium, there is no steady-state condition for the ﬂows 
of medium-skill workers in and out of low-skill jobs. We therefore must specify a value for 
one more parameter and so we assume that β = 0.5. In this case, the inequalities on U(si) 
are 
s1 − c1  <  rU(s2)

s1 − c1  ≥  rU(s1)

s2 − c2  ≥  rU(s2).

We assume that w11  = 180, 000, the median real wage for the low-skill workers and 
w22 = 202, 920, the median wage for the medium-skill workers.  The ﬁrst two steps of the 
calibration yield 
m(θ)φ1  1.867 
m(θ)φ2  2.163 
m(θ)  4.030 
φ1  0.463 
φ2  0.537 
δ1  0.176 
δ2  0.139 
e11  0.592 
e22  0.331 
s1 − c1  190,450 
s2 − c2  212,580 
rU(s1)  169,550 
rU(s2)  193,340 
Note that s1 − c1 < rU(s2), which is consistent with ex post segmentation. 
m(θ)
Finally, in this case, θ = .65 and  = 6.20, and the zero-value conditions imply 
θ 
c1  207,670 
c2  87,509 
s1  398,120 
s2  300,089 
Clearly, the cost and productivity parameters are in the wrong order.
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Appendix 3. Simulation equations 
The two steady-state equations equate the ﬂows into and out of unemployment for each 
of the skill levels. These two equations can be written as 
φ1m(θ)γ1u = δ1(p1 − γ1u) 
φ1  φ2  m(θ)γ2u(  +  ) = p2 − γ2u. 
δ1  δ2 
In the cross-skill matching equilibrium, the two unemployment values are 
bR1 + m(θ)φ1βS1 rU(s1) = 
R1 + m(θ)φ1β 
bR1R2 + βm(θ)[φ1R2S1 + φ2R1S2]
rU(s2) =  ,
R1R2 + βm(θ)(φ1R2 + φ2R1) 
where S1 = s1 − c1, and S2 = s2 − c2, R1 = r + δ1, and R2 = r + δ2. 
The zero vacancy value equations for this equilibrium type are 
rV (s1) = −c1+ 
m(θ) 
{γ1[
(1 − β)[S1 − rU(s1)] 
−V (s1)]+γ2[
(1 − β)[S1 − rU(s2)] 
−V (s1)]}
θ R1  R1 









− V (s2)]. 
Setting V (s1) = V (s2) = 0 and substituting for the unemployment values gives 
c1R1θ 
= 
γ1(S1 − b)R1  + γ2(
(S1 − b)R1R2 + βm(θ)φ2R1(S1 − S2)
)
(1 − β)m(θ)  R1 + m(θ)φ1β R1R2 + βm(θ)(φ1R2 + φ2R1) 
c2R2θ 
= γ2[
(S2 − b)R1R2 + βm(θ)φ1R2(S2 − S1)
]. 
(1 − β)m(θ)  R1R2 + βm(θ)(φ1R2 + φ2R1) 
These two equations, along with the two steady-state equations, are the equations that 
must be solved for the equilibrium.  After solving for the equilibrium, the wages can be 
found by using the wage equations 
w(s1,s1) =  βS1 + (1 − β)rU(s1)

w(s2,s1) =  βS1 + (1 − β)rU(s2)

w(s2,s2) =  βS2 + (1 − β)rU(s2).
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